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Spies Among Us: Can New Legislation Stop
Spyware from Bugging Your Computer?
By Michael D. Lane*
I. Introduction
Imagine that when you turn on your computer to access the
Internet, invisible spies are watching your every move, even directing
your browsing to sites you don't want to visit. Imagine your own
computer working against you, using bandwidth and processing
power to communicate information about you to remote locations.
What you have imagined is known as spyware and probably exists in
some form on your own computer.
Spyware-and how to combat it-has recently been a
frequent topic of discussion in consumer and technology circles. The
unfortunate reality is that many consumers are unaware that spyware
exists, much less that it can cause serious problems. A recent survey
by the National Cyber Security Alliance found that eighty percent of
home personal computers are infected with spyware, but only ten
percent of consumers had any idea what spyware programs do.'
Microsoft has lost some of its share of the Internet browser market
share to companies like Mozilla (maker of the Firefox browser),
which has gained significant numbers of users by offering an Internet
browser less susceptible to spyware attacks than Internet Explorer. 2
It is probable that these concerns over spyware and its ability to affect
consumers prompted Microsoft's recent decision to jump into the
* J.D. candidate, May 2006, Loyola University Chicago School of Law;
B.B.A. Finance, 2003, University of Notre Dame. The author would like to thank
his family and friends for all their help and support throughout law school. Special
thanks go to my father for his help and to Meg for always being supportive.
Byron Acohido & Jon Swartz, Market to Protect Consumer PCs Seems
Poised for Takeoff, As Spyware, Viruses Spread, Threat to E-commerce Grows,
USA TODAY, Dec. 27, 2004, at B 1.
2 Gregg Keizer, Microsoft Moves on Spyware to Stymie Firefox, CMP
TECHWEB, Dec. 17, 2004, 2004 WL 64589063, available at
http://www.techweb.com/wire/security/55800866.
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battle against spyware by offering free software, at least for now, to
customers to combat malware.
3
This article will examine spyware's legal status by first
explaining what spyware is and how it affects consumers. Next, the
problem of spyware will be examined under the legal mechanics
currently employed by courts to explain why further legislative action
may be necessary. Finally, new and proposed legislation that
specifically targets spyware will be examined. By comparison to
existing law its potential effectiveness in combating regulatory gaps
that spyware can exploit will be determined.
II. Background on Spyware and the Law
A. The Growing Concern with Spyware
Spyware can do any number of things once it implants itself
onto a computer's hard drive, including tracking the websites visited,
logging the keystrokes made, or changing settings on the computer
such as the "home page."4  These types of attacks often render
computers useless, forcing consumers to spend hundreds of dollars on
software and professional assistance to remove the effects of
spyware.5 A recent newspaper column described the experience of
Rachel Dodes, whose personal struggle against numerous insidious
programs typifies a severe spyware infection. 6 Dodes, an Internet
user, began by downloading a free program from the Internet, but
unknowingly opened the door to a host of spyware programs.7 She
suffered a barrage of pop-up ads and lost control of her Internet
browser.8 Although she tried to use software designed to eliminate
the threat, spyware's menacing nature escaped the ability of software
to combat it, and some deleted files were even reinstalled when her
' David Bank & Robert A. Guth, Microsoft Offers Free Software to Fight
'Spyware' and Viruses, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2005, at B3. (noting that malware
includes several types of malicious software: spyware, worms, and viruses)
4 Alex L. Goldfayn, Spyware Tough to Stop, But Some Defenses Work, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 1, 2005, at B4.
5 Acohido & Swartz, supra note 1.
6 Rachel Dodes, Terminating Spyware with Extreme Prejudice, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 30, 2004, at G1.
7 Id.
8 id.
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computer rebooted. 9 In the end, she chose to spend hundreds of
dollars backing up files and reinstalling her computer's software in
order to avoid spending more money on an entirely new computer.
10
Spyware attacks a computer in so many different ways that
any legislation would have to address software that varies
tremendously in terms of functionality and effects. 1' While some
users agree to install spyware in clearly articulated license
agreements, other spyware automatically installs itself through
security flaws sometimes known as back doors, or through the fine
print of complex end-user license agreements.' 2 One of the problems
in mounting a legal battle against spyware is the fact that it has so
many forms and functions that make it hard to precisely define.13 As
described in a hearing before the House Subcommittee on Energy and
Commerce, "'Spyware' programs can be installed on users'
computers in a variety of ways, and they can have widely differing
functionalities." 14
Jeffrey Friedberg, Microsoft's Director of Windows Privacy,
recently proposed to the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade,
and Consumer Protection one way to help define spyware more
precisely in legal terms.' 5 In Mr. Friedberg's view, the emphasis of
9 Id.
10 Id.
" Brad Slutsky & Sheila Baran, Just a Tad Intrusive?, 14 Bus. L. TODAY 33
(2004) (noting that spyware can track internet behavior, collect personal
information, send spain on behalf of third parties, change the user's home page, or
generate ads).
12 Ronald R. Urbach & Gary A. Kibel, Adware/Spyware: An Update
Regarding Pending Litigation and Legislation, 16 No. 7 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 12,
12 (2004).
13 See Spyware: What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: Hearing on H.R. 2929
Before the Subcomm. On Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, 109th
Cong. (Apr. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Spyware Hearings] (statement of Mr. Ari
Schwartz, Associate Director, Center for Democracy and Technology), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 108_househearings&docid=f:93308.pdf (Last visited
May 10, 2005).
14 Spyware Hearings, supra note 13 (statement of Mr. Ari Schwartz).
15 Spyware Hearings, supra note 13 (statement of Mr. Jeffrey Friedberg,
Director of Windows Privacy, Microsoft) available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_househearings&docid=f:93308.pdf (Last visited
May 10, 2005).
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any law against spyware should be placed on lack of user notice and
control, because some aspects of the technology itself have legitimate
and beneficial uses. 6 Some characteristics of new technology can be
beneficial to computer users by providing more customized and
enhanced features, leading Friedberg to argue that Con ,ress should
use caution in designing new laws to combat spyware. To avoid
discouraging innovation, any such law should focus on deceptive
behavior and its impact on the consumer rather than the functionality
of the software or the act itself. 18 While recognizing that the Federal
Trade Commission Act' 9 ("FTC Act") and the Consumer Fraud and
Abuse Act20 ("CFAA") can be enforced more rigorously against
spyware, Friedberg urged Congress to enact any new law to
"supplement the existing legal framework only where gaps are
identified. '
21
Currently, neither federal statutes such as the CFAA and the
FTC Act, nor common law trespass to chattels, have been effectively
used to combat the spyware problems that face consumers in
22cyberspace. Under current enforcement of these legal doctrines,
individual consumers are unprotected against makers of spyware in
two main areas, one which Friedberg called "notice and consent," 23
and compensation.
In this article, notice and control refers to the fact that many
people do not know about spyware, nor are able to control its
functions once their computers are infected.24  Because consumers
16 Spyware Hearings, supra note 13 (statement of Mr. Jeffery Friedberg).
17 Id.
18 id.
'9 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2004).
20 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2004).
21 Spyware Hearings, supra note 13 (statement of Mr. Jeffery Friedberg).
22 Spyware Hearings, supra note 13 (statement of Mr. J. Howard Beales III,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission) available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 108_househearings&docid=f:93308.pdf (Last visited
May 10, 2005) (Mr. Beales noted that "[Wjhat limits our ability to bring these
cases is that... the bad guys ride off into the hills. But these are cyberhills and
there are no footprints.").
23 Spyware Hearings, supra note 13 (statement of Mr. Jeffery Friedberg).
24 See id.; See also Goldfayn, supra note 4 (discussing users lack of spyware
knowledge).
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continue to be unaware of the problem of spyware, are often unaware
of its installation, and are unaware of any way to remove it, such a
regulatory gap exists in this area. Compensation, or deterrence,
refers to the fact that where victims have been injured, some
compensation from the offender could serve to make them whole.25
Additionally, compensation or fines could serve a deterrent function,
decreasing the amount of injurious spyware activity on the Internet.26
If individual consumers are unable to seek compensation for the time
and expense spent combating spyware, this could be viewed as such a
regulatory gap in terms of compensation or deterrence. However,
deterrence by means of consumer lawsuits is only one way to deal
with the problem-the Federal Trade Commission could pursue
makers of spyware who deceive the public.27
Deterrence by lawsuit may not even be extremely effective, as
many persons who know they have a spyware infection are unable to
28find it on their computers, making it hard to identify. The previous
example of Ms. Dodes shows how consumers could click their way
out of a private right of action-she accepted, without reviewing or
understanding its significance, a license agreement provided by the
software maker, which could prevent her from taking legal action
because she gave her consent. In addition, laws creating a private
right of action would likely be viewed with suspicion by the software
industry. All indications are that the current regulatory environment
does not force spyware companies to provide explicit and adequate
notice, or give consumers the ability to remove the program if its
consequences are different than anticipated.3°
Some may argue that rigorous enforcement of existing laws
25 See generally Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law,
85 COLUM. L. REv. 1193 (1985).
26 See id.
27 Spyware Hearings, supra note 13 (statement of Mr. J. Howard Beales III)
28 See Andrew Briney, Spywary, INFO. SECURITY, Feb. 2005, at 72
29 Courts have split on whether these so called "clickwrap" license agreements
are valid in all cases; Compare Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306
F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (court refused to enforce end user license agreement after
consumer downloaded program) with Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 293 A.D.2d 587
(N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (clicking "I Agree" on end user license agreement creates
valid contract).
30 Spyware Hearings, supra note 13 (statement of Mr. J. Howard Beales III)
(noting that it is possible to bring unfair practices actions for non-explicit end user
license agreements, but the FTC has never done so in the software context).
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may render it unnecessary to pass a new law to provide consumers
the right to compensation through a private right of action, because
spyware purveyor's conduct violates existing law.31 In contrast to
this view, some of the newly enacted or proposed anti-spyware laws
contain provisions which would fill the regulatory gaps consumers
currently face.32  One major feature of the newly proposed anti-
spyware laws is the inclusion of a right of action for consumers
against the makers of spyware, 33 as well as heightened notice and
removal requirements for any software that fits into a certain
category, such as those that collect personally identifiable
information.34 The consumer's position can be protected under
existing laws only if changes are made to the ways these laws are
prosecuted and enforced. The desired deterrent effect could be
achieved if rigorous application of the law creates a credible threat in
the mind of spyware makers. 35 The remaining regulatory gap that
deserves lawmakers' attention is the first problem identified-
adequate notice to consumers and the ability to remove the problem.
B. Current Legal Framework
1. CFAA
The CFAA was originally enacted as a criminal statute to
prosecute computer crimes of federal interest. 36  The CFAA was
31 Spyware Hearings, supra note 13 (statement of Mr. J. Howard Beales HI).
32 See, e.g., SPY ACT H.R. 29, 109th Cong. (2005) (providing for notice to
consumers prior to installation of spyware and potential for fines for violations).
33 See Spyware Control Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-40-101 to 13-40-401
(West 2004); SPY ACT, H.R. 29, 109th Cong. (2005), Internet Spyware Prevention
Act of 2005, H.R. 744, 109th Cong. (2005).
34 See Spyware Control Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-40-101 to 13-40-401
(West 2004); SPY ACT, H.R. 29, 109th Cong. (2005), Internet Spyware Prevention
Act of 2005, H.R. 744, 109th Cong. (2005).
35 See Posner, supra note 25.
36 Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp.
2d 1121, 1127 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (citing S. Rep. No. 99-432, at 3 (1986)
(outlining the CFAA legislative history and its expansion by Congress)); See
generally Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and
Application of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, (18 U.S.C. § 1030), 174 A.L.R.
Fed. 101 (2001) (discussing how the CFAA was first passed as a counterfeit access
device and was created to prohibit unauthorized access to federal interest
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amended in 1994 to provide for a private right of action where "any
person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this
section." 37 This private action is limited only to certain situations: (1)
where there is loss to one or more persons aggregating $5,000 in any
one year period; (2) where there has been-or there is a potential
for-an impairment or modification of any medical treatment,
diagnosis, examination, or care; (3) where there has been physical
injury; (4) where there is a threat to public health or safety; or (5)
where there is damage affecting a computer system used by or for a
government entity in furtherance of the administration of justice,
national defense, or national security.
38
The most likely case for an individual consumer who wishes
to bring a private action against a spyware maker under the CFAA is
a situation where there has been damage or a loss of $5,000 in a
year. 39  The statute defines damage as "any impairment to the
integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or
information.' 40 "Loss" can be "any reasonable cost to any victim,
including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage
assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or information
to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost
incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of
interruption of service.' 41 The $5,000 figure need not come from any
one single action, but can result from multiple events over a year.
In many cases, courts have defined "damage" to include an
unauthorized slowdown of computer processing or an unauthorized
use of finite computing power.43 In America Online, Inc. v. National
computers).
31 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2004).
38 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
39 Only in extremely rare cases would a consumer have worry that a spyware
attack could cause "an impairment or modification of any medical treatment,
diagnosis, examination, or care"; "physical injury"; or "a threat to public health or
safety." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5).
40 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8).
41 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11).
42 Creative Computing v. Getloaded.com LLC, 386 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir.
2004).
43 Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890, 899
(N.D. Iowa 2001). See also Four Seasons Hotels and Resorts B.V. v. Consorcio
Barr, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1322-23 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (holding that damages
result when there is intentional access without permission and when people cause
2005] 289
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Health Care Discount, Inc., America Online ("AOL") sued a sender
of bulk e-mail ("spam") for unauthorized access to its computer
network, which used only a small fraction of the company's
computing power.4  Because this use affected the "integrity or
availability" of AOL's servers and computers, causing damage over
$5,000, it fell within the scope of the CFAA, entitling AOL to
recover.
45
There are significant differences in the treatment courts have
given the damage requirement of the CFAA,46 with some courts
holding that that the $5,000 may properly come from only one
computer,47 and others finding that claims may be aggregated among
multiple plaintiffs to reach the $5,000 damage or loss figure.48 In re
DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litigation49 was a suit launched by a group
of consumers with concerns about privacy stemming from
DoubleClick's collection of information through Internet "cookies. 5 °
The plaintiffs made a claim under the CFAA that the cookies used by
DoubleClick to access their personal computers and collect their
personal information were unauthorized.51  DoubleClick did not
dispute this claim, but did contest the applicability of the CFAA on
the basis that no single user complained that DoubleClick's cookie
had caused $5,000 in damage.52 In dismissing the CFAA claim, the
court found that the amount of damages could only be aggregated
"over victims and time for a single act," and that no complaint
involving a single computer had been damaged over the $5,000
congestion).
44 Nat'l Health Care Disc., 174 F. Supp. 2d at 899.
45 id.
46 See Luke J. Albrecht, Online Marketing: The Use of Cookies and Remedies
for Internet Users, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 421, 431-33, 444-45 (2003).
47 In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 524 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
48 In re Am. Online, Inc. Version 5.0 Software Litig., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359,
1374 (S.D. Fla. 2001) [hereinafter Version 5.0]; In re Toys R Us, Inc., Privacy
Litig., No. 00-CV-2746, 2001 WL 34517252, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001).
49 DoubleClick, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d at 500-04.
'0 Id. at 502-03 ("Cookies are computer programs commonly used by Web
sites to store useful information such as usernames, passwords, and preferences,
making it easier for users to access Web pages in an efficient manner.").
51 Id. at 519-20.
52 Id. at 520.
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threshold in a single year.53
The opposite result was reached in In re America Online, Inc.
Version 5.0 Software Litigation, where the court found that damages
or losses could be added across a group of plaintiffs injured as a
result of a violation of the CFAA.54 Version 5.0 was a class action by
Internet users and other Internet service providers ("ISPs") against
AOL for allegedly violating several federal and state laws by
distributing Version 5.0 of its popular Internet access software, and
allowing consumers to install the allegedly flawed program on their
computers. 55  The court rejected the statutory analysis of
DoubleClick, holding that the court in that case failed to properly find
a "dangling participle" in the part of the statute relating to damage "to
a protected computer."56  The court instead determined that the
language allowed for aggregation, and that Congress' continued
expansion of the CFAA further supported aggregation of the damage
amount.57  In language reflective of the dilemma consumers face
under DoubleClick's interpretation of the CFAA, the court
recognized that requiring each home user to have over $5,000 in
damages would not protect consumers "because $5,000 is far more
than the average price of a home computer system."
58
A similar argument made by plaintiffs in the class action suit
In re Toys R Us, Inc., Privacy Litigation was accepted by the court.5
9
This case once more dealt with the placement of cookies on
plaintiffs' computers which, unbeknownst to plaintiffs, tracked their
web browsing and purchasing activity. 6° The court recognized that
when it "liberally construed" the statute, the placement of cookies on
consumers' computers could constitute a single "act" under the
CFAA, and that damages could be aggregated across the class.6 1 In
approving aggregation, the court noted the Senate committee report
" Id. at 524-26.
-4 Version 5.0, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 1374.
5 Id. at 1363-66.
56 Id. at 1373.
17 Id. at 1373-74.
58 id.
'9 In re Toys R Us, Inc., Privacy Litig., No. 00-CV-2746, 2001 WL 34517252,
at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001).
60 Id. at* 1-2.
61 Id. at *9-11.
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for the CFAA stated that losses from a sing le act could be aggregated
in order to reach the damage threshold. Representing a positive
argument for to consumers in spyware cases, the court also
recognized that the expenses the victim incurs in remedying the
defendant's actions are included in the damages for which Congress
intended to compensate. 6
3
Another case provides an example of a class action that was
allowed to proceed under the CFAA where individuals suffered
damage, but none of them individually suffered $5,000 in damage.64
In Miles v. America Online, Inc., individual consumers complained
that AOL deceived them by advertising a flat monthly fee for
unlimited Internet access, but failing to disclose that long-distance
charges may apply.65  The CFAA claim arose because of the
software's "configuration" of the plaintiffs' computers, which caused
the computers to dial telephone numbers that incurred various long
distance charges. 66 The court allowed the initial class certification
where the claims appeared to be meritorious. 67 The court made this
decision based on the procedural distinction between a dismissal
based on failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and
dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 68 The court
refused to dismiss the properly pled federal question for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because it was neither "immaterial and
made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction," nor "wholly
insubstantial and frivolous."
69
A further monetary disincentive to consumer private action
under the CFAA is the fact that courts have disallowed expenses
incurred in tracking down the perpetrator to be included as a loss. 7
0
As Tyco International (US), Inc. v. John Does, 1-3 demonstrates,
62 Toys R Us, Inc., 2001 WL 34517252 at *11.
63 Id. at *10.
64 Miles v. Am. Online, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 297, 299-300 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
65 Id. at 299.
66 Id. at 300-01.
67 Id. at 300 (noting that the possibility remained that no subject matter
jurisdiction existed on the basis that the individual's claims should not be
aggregated).
68 id.
69 Id.
70 Tyco Int'l (US), Inc. v. John Does, 1-3, No. 01 Civ. 3856, 2003 WL
21638205, at *1-3 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2003).
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cyber attacks are often done in a sophisticated manner, making it
more difficult for the average person to discover who was behind the
cyber attack.71 Tyco, the victim of a cyber attack, expended over
$136,000 to track down the individuals who remotely carried out a
series of attacks on their computer systems.72 Logic dictates that an
individual consumer would likely never take on such a cost if he
could not be compensated by his attacker. The CFAA is designed not
to provide this type of compensation, as it limits damages to only
those listed in the statute, which includes economic damages-but
not punitive damages.73
The CFAA in its current form retains potential for those
wishing to pursue damaging spyware. However, given courts
reluctance to aggregate claims to reach the $5000 threshold,74
consumers may be unable to bring claims under the statute.
2. The FTC Act
75
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") has the power to
prohibit practices that are unlawful under the FTC Act, including
those which are "unfair or deceptive." 76 The FTC Act prohibits
"unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce" and grants
the U.S. Attorney General power to bring a civil action against
violators,77 which could result in imposition of fines of $10,000 for
each violation and injunctive relief.78 While these provisions are
located in Section 45 of the U.S. Code, case law more commonly
refers to its powers under the Act, or Section 5.79
Section 13(b) of the statute, or Section 53(b) of the code,
grants the FTC power to bring an action to obtain relief for false or
deceptive advertising. Recently, the FTC has been using this power
71 Id. at *1.
72 Id. at *2.
71 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (g).
74 DoubleClick, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d at 524-26.
75 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2004).
76 15 U.S.C. § 45.
77 15 U.S.C. § 45(m).
78 id.
79 See, e.g., California Dental Ass'n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
80 Id. at § 53(b).
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to protect the privacy of individuals by limiting how information is
collected and used by Internet companies.8' Some examples include
cases against, or settlements with, Geocities, Liberty Financial, Eli
Lilly, and Microsoft, among others, who were all utilizing Internet
technology to aggregate consumer data and information." The
success of these cases bodes well for the FTC's use of Section 5 of
the FTC Act to prosecute spyware cases, because it indicates the
FTC's willingness to wade into cyberspace to enforce rules currently
enforced in more familiar settings.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Seismic Entertainment
Productions, Inc., the FTC successfully sought a temporary
restraining order against several companies that were in the business
of exploiting certain vulnerabilities of Microsoft's Internet
Explorer.83 The defendants were a group of companies controlled by
a man who had been sued many times for his involvement in sending
spam e-mail.84 The defendants installed a software code, "without
the consumers' knowledge or authorization, that g[ave] the
defendants access to those computers for purposes of advertising. ', 8
5
In granting a temporary restraining order, the court recognized the
impact on consumers of many of the typical problems associated with
spyware:
... unauthorized changes of their home pages, difficulty
using their computers, and infusions of pop-up ads,
including pornographic ads and ads for anti-spyware
software. The affected users were not notified of the
defendants' activities and did not know what had caused
the problems with their computers, making the defendants'
activities both deceptive and unfair.
86
The court found no countervailing benefits to consumers, and
81 Kevin P. Cronin & Ronald N. Weikers, Data Security and Privacy Law:
Combating Cyberthreats, DATA SEC. & PRIVACY LAW § 7:10 (2004).
" Id. (showing that often this collection of data is done through the use of
"cookies").
83 FIFC v. Seismic Entm't Prods., Inc., No. Civ. 04-377-JD, 2004 WL
2403124, at *1 (D.N.H. 2004).
84 FTC Files First Spyware Case, 22 No. 10 ANDREWS COMPUTER &
INTERNET LITIG. REP. 16, Oct. 19, 2004.
85 Seismic Entm't Prods., Inc., No. Civ. 04-377-JD, 2004 WL 2403124, at *1.
86 Id. at *3.
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noted that the defendants' activities "cause[d] substantial injury to
consumers by negatively affecting the performance of their
computers and requiring significant time and expense to remedy the
problems."
87
Cases like Seismic Entertainment show that the FTC is
willing to extend its protection of consumers into cyberspace. As
noted by FTC officials, Section 5 of the Act could potentially be used
against spyware companies. 88  However, cases would have to be
brought individually, and given budgetary constraints placed on the
FTC, new legislation could provide additional means of consumer
protection from spyware.
89
3. Trespass to Chattels
Trespass to chattels occurs when one person intentionally
either dispossess another of a chattel or uses or intermeddles with
another's use of a chattel.90 "Intermeddling" means intentionally
bringing about a physical contact with the chattel. 91 One of the first
cases to apply a trespass to chattels theory to a cyber-tort was
CompuServe Incorporated v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.92 In this case,
the court followed recent rulings93 and held that electronic signals
used and read by a computer create sufficient contacts to support a
trespass to chattels claim.94 The victim of a trespass to chattels claim
must suffer some actual damage and cannot sue for nominal
damages. 95 However, as demands on "the disk space and drain [on]
the processing power" made this part of the property unavailable to
the victim, sufficient damages existed for a court to hear the trespass
87 Id. at *4.
88 Spyware Hearings, supra note 13 (statement of Mr. J. Howard Beales III).
89 Id.
90 Register.Com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 404 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Torts. § 217(b) (1965)).
91 Restatement (Second) of Torts. § 217 cmt. e (West 2005).
92 CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1015 (S.D.
Ohio 1997).
93 See, e.g., Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 468 (Ct. App.
1996) (noting where the parents of a young hacker were sued for accessing a
computer server in an attempt to locate a long-distance access code).
94 Cyber Promotions, 962 F. Supp. at 1021.
9- Id. at 1023.
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claim. 96 Making note that self-help should be tried first, the court
allowed the claim because the defendant acted to skirt any security
measures CompuServe imposed.
97
The theory of trespass to chattels has continued to expand in
cyberspace beyond its first initial cases.98 One of the most cited
cases employing the theory in recent years is eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's
Edge, Inc.9 A well known Internet auction site, eBay, sued a
competitor who used "robots," computer programs designed to
continuously query the eBay site for auction information, along with
other auction sites. 100  This information was subsequently
consolidated and posted en masse in one location. 101 The court
granted a preliminary injunction on the trespass claim because it
found a likelihood of potential harm to eBay, a likelihood of success
on the merits, and the balance of hardship in favor of eBay. 10 2 eBay
was likely to succeed in showing that Bidder's Edge intentionally,
and without authorization, interfered with eBay's use of its computer
system, and that this interference proximately caused damage.
10 3
Although eBay advanced several theories as to why the value of its
computer systems had been damaged, the court accepted the theory
that the denial of an injunction would encourage other companies to
mimic Bidder's Edge, thereby overloading eBay's systems.,0 4 Not
every trespass is actionable, however, as the ruling has been limited
only to those areas where there is a sufficient actual or threatened
harm to a computer or a system.' 
05
96 Cyber Promotions, 962 F. Supp. at 1022.
9' Id. at 1021-23.
98 See generally Laura Quilter, The Continuing Expansion of Cyberspace
Trespass to Chattels, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 421, 430-442 (2002) (discussing
past cases and the assumptions underlying cyberspace trespass to chattels).
99 eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
100 Id. at 1060-63.
101 Id. at 1060-63.
102 Id. at 1064-73.
'03 Id. at 1069-72.
104 eBay, 100 F. Supp .2d at 1071-72.
105 See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 300, 308-12 (Cal. 2003) (holding
that a former employer cannot obtain an injunction against a former employee who
sent several e-mails to all employees where only negligible computing power was
used, and no threatened harm or imitation would create danger of sufficient
damage).
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Another interesting development in the area of trespass to
chattels is the award of punitive damages for willful and wanton
disregard of the property rights of others. One such case authorizing
an award of punitive damages as a result of spain e-mail was America
Online Inc. v. National Health Care Discount, Inc. 106 Here, the court
found the defendant liable not only for trespass to chattels, 10 7 but also
for a violation of the CFAA and Virginia's Computer Crimes Statute
section 18.2-152.12.108 The court found that because these theories
were all based on the same act, no duplicative damages would be
awarded. 109 The court calculated damages based on each e-mail sent,
plus some amount for profit." 0 The court also awarded punitive
damages,'1 ' ostensibly on the trespass claim, because the CFAA
specifically limits recovery to economic damages 112 and the Virginia
Statute does not provide for punitive damages.
The ruling closely resembled a recent New York case, Tyco
International (US), Inc. v. John Does, 1-3, in which the court
awarded punitive damages based on a trespass to chattels claim
where actual damages were neither calculated, nor sought. 114 The
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that "'in actions of trespass and all action
on the case for torts,"' a jury may inflict what are called exemplary,
punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant." 15 The Tyco Court
determined that punitive damages of $10,000 would be appropriate in
this case, where the defendant's intent was to crash the plaintiff's
106 Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890, 902
(N.D. Iowa. 2001).
107 Id. at 900.
108 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152 (1999) (the computer crimes statute provides
for protection against, among other causes of action, computer fraud, unsolicited
bulk electronic mail, computer trespass, invasion of privacy, theft of computer
services, and harassment).
109 Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d at 900.
"0 Id. at 900-01.
... Id. at 902.
112 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2005).
113 VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-152.12.
114 Tyco Int'l (US), Inc. v. John Does, 1-3, No. 01 Civ. 3856, 2003 WL
21638205, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
115 Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 306 (1992), cited in Tyco Int'l
(US), Inc. v. John Does, 1-3, No. 01 Civ. 3856, 2003 WL 21638205 at *4
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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servers in order to deter other such actions.' 16
III.Consumer Impact: Why the Current Regime Leaves
a Regulatory Gap
A. Notice / Control
Despite the attention to spyware of many in the software
industry, the average consumer is still ignorant of its methods, and is
unable to remove it from his computers." 7 The current legal
mechanisms are retrospective in nature: a consumer (or a group of
consumers) must file an action under the CFAA or common law
trespass to chattels arguing that its specific action was a violation
under one particular set of facts; the FTC must then determine that a
spyware purveyors software action is deceptive, and then find and
pursue the company, something that is often easier said than done." 
8
How could the current laws be providing adequate notice and control
where the evidence is clear that the average consumer does not know
spyware is on his computer, does not know who put the spyware on
his computer, and cannot remove the spyware from his computer?' 19
The CFAA does not proscribe specific standards for
companies to follow, leaving consumers in no better position to learn
about or control spyware. 12 Although the action of much spyware
violates many of the terms of the statute, the requirement that any
access to computers be authorized 12 is muddled by two factors.
First, the question is obscured in cases where spyware notice is
buried deep within end user license agreements, forcing courts to first
deal with whether this constitutes consent. 22  Second, unless the
116 Tyco Int'l, 2003 WL 23374767 at *4.
117 See Slutsky & Baran, supra note 11.
118 Spyware Hearings, supra note 13 (statement of Mr. J. Howard Beales III)
(noting the difficulty of pursuing cyber-criminals).
"9 Acohido & Swartz, supra note 1, at BI.
120 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
121 Id.
122 Compare Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir.
2002) (court refused to enforce end user license agreement after consumer
downloaded program) with Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 293 A.D.2d 587 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2002) (clicking "I Agree" on end user license agreement creates valid
contract).
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statute clearly allows for aggregation among consumers, it is highly
unlikely that the average consumer will suffer the requisite $5,000
damage threshold in one year.
Similarly, trespass to chattels, as a common law doctrine,
does not require software to provide notice in any specific manner,
nor does it require companies to make their spyware easy to control
or remove. In cases where the defendant argues that the consumer
consented to the installation of the spyware, the court has to
determine whether the action of the spyware exceeded the plaintiff's
consent. 123 In any case, the best the consumer can currently hope for
is a ruling that a particular set of spyware, distributed by a particular
software company, amounted to trespass or intermeddling with the
consumer's chattels.
The FTC Act currently provides the best hope for consumers
in setting a standard for notice and control. This is due to the simple
fact that the FTC is a single actor that could target specific practices,
setting precedent and potentially influencing other spyware
companies to reform their behavior. 124 However, even the FTC faces
the problem of taking action retrospectively. The FTC can only bring
a civil action after determining that a particular practice is
deceptive. 125
Because either consumers or the FTC would have to bring a
civil action against a spyware company on a case-by-case basis, no
specific standard is set to require standardized notice of the actions of
the spyware. No specific removal requirements are articulated to
allow consumers to easily remove unwanted spyware from their
computers.
B. Compensation / Deterrence
The current legal environment is ineffective in terms of
providing consumers with compensation for their damages or in
imposing monetary damages that could serve as a deterrent to future
offenders. Most consumers would be unable to meet the damage
requirement of the CFAA acting alone,' 26 the damages for trespass to
123 See CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1027
(S.D. Ohio. 1997) (this assumes that the court in question would accept a clickwrap
license agreement as any kind of consent at all).
124 See Posner, supra note 25.
125 15 U.S.C. § 45.
126 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a).
2005]
Loyola Consumer Law Review
chattels are difficult to measure, 127 and budgetary constraints place
logical limits to the amount of cases the FTC can bring against
spyware companies. 128
Under the CFAA, although the spyware programs may harm
the host computer, the consumer is unable to take action except in the
most severe cases of spyware infection, such as cases of identity
theft. 129  While many companies are able to meet the damage
threshold on their own, individuals generally cannot unless the courts
are willing to allow their claims to be aggregated across a group of
consumers. 130  The few lawsuits that have been brought by
corporations under the CFAA may serve some deterrent function, but
the impact of these cases has done little to stem the rising tide of
spyware infecting consumer's computers.
While individual consumers may be able to receive
compensation in some cases, most spyware does not cause the type of
damage necessary to support an injunction or claims for damages. As
in eBay, the courts have difficulty determining the exact amount of
damage caused by use of consumer's processing power, 31 and
consumers do not face the same threats from similar behavior as a
major online company. 132  Only an extension of recent punitive
damage awards would threaten spyware companies, but most courts
have been unwilling to impose such damages in cyberspace. 1
33
While there is potential for current laws to provide
compensation or deterrence functions, a regulatory gap remains in
this area. Consumers all too often give up their own private right of
action by failing to read licensing agreements. Added to the courts'
unwillingness to extend class actions or aggregation to CFAA claims
and the lack of punitive damages available under trespass to chattels
claims, consumers face an uphill battle when seeking compensation
127 eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1071-72 (where the court struggled with the
concept of loss of value under this theory, but nevertheless found a likelihood of
success on the merits bases on encouraging similar behavior).
128 Spyware Hearings, supra note 13 (statement of Mr. J. Howard Beales I1).
129 Pest Patrol, Inc., PestPatrol Product Development VP Roger Thompson to
Testify Before Congress on Dangers of Spyware, Bus. WIRE, Nov. 18, 2003 (noting
that the average identity theft results in $9,800 in profit for the thief).
130 Version 5.0, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 1374.
131 eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
132 Id. at 1071-72.
133 Michael L. Rustad, Punitive Damages in Cyberspace: Where in the World
is the Consumer?, 7 CHAP. L. REv. 39, passim (2004).
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or deterrence under the current legal framework.
Punitive damages imposed on spyware makers could serve as
a deterrent against the continued use of such devices to invade the
computers of consumers.' 34 Additionally, the financial rewards that
punitive damages bring could help consumers pay for the time and
expense of cleaning their systems of spyware or in purchasing a new
system, depending on the severity of the infection. Recently,
Michael L. Rustad, a Suffolk University Law School professor,
conducted a comprehensive analysis of all Internet-related cases
where punitive damages were awarded. 35  Interestingly, Rustad
found that no consumer was able to receive punitive damages based
on any online sale or service, or in any cases where personal
information had been harvested.' 1
36
Additionally problematic in both the CFAA and trespass to
chattels cases is the fact that consumers themselves have to face the
defense of consent to end-user license agreements prior to the
installation of any software.1 37 The use of trespass to chattels in
spyware cases is an interesting and novel application of a common-
law theory, but its effectiveness is limited by the following
considerations: Especially because many purveyors of spyware use
legal means, such as licensing agreements, to protect themselves,
consumers may be unable to assert claims against spyware companies
unless they violate their own agreements.' 38 Trespass to chattels has
the potential to be a stopgap measure against the worst spyware
offenders, but would likely not even be as effective as FTC action.
While the FTC cannot provide compensation to every
consumer that has been injured by spyware,140- rigorous pursuit of
spyware under the FTC Act would serve a powerful deterrent
'34 See Rustad, supra note 133.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 50-52.
137 Software Varieties Pose Legal Challenges, 3 No. 24 CYBERLAW CRIME
REPORT 10 (Dec. 1, 2003).
138 Id.
139 See generally, Michael L. Rustad and Thomas H. Koenig, Cybertorts and
Legal Lag: An Empirical Analysis, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 77 (2003) (arguing
that legal mechanisms are behind in their deal with changes in the way technology
affects torts, and courts sometimes apply old theories in novel manners to
compensate for this lag).
'40 See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2004) (showing
that the FTC Act does not provide for private recovery).
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function. It could protect consumers from the worst spyware
offenders, such as those that perpetrate identity theft, as well as
discourage similar behavior from other offenders. The complaint
filed by the FTC in Seismic Entertainment Products cited the specific
harms of spyware: "Defendants' practices cause or have caused
consumers' computers to malfunction, slow down, crash, or cease
working properly, and cause or have caused consumers to lose data
stored on their computers.' 4 1  Some might hope that continued
vigilance by the FIC in protecting the rights of consumers from the
unfair practices of some spyware makers seem to make a new law
unnecessary. Companies could easily be deterred by injunctions or
actions for disgorgement of improperly gained profits.
A rigorous crackdown on "unfair practices" by the FTC may
also not be sufficient to provide adequate notice to consumers. While
strong action by the FTC could potentially eliminate some of the
problems caused by spyware that refuses to be removed from
computers, this would have to be done on a case-by-case basis, which
would not be as effective as a standard practice. The current action
taken by the FTC, while a positive step towards a resolution of the
spyware problem, will likely not completely solve the problem that
consumers face in gaining compensation from spyware makers, or in
deterring their behavior altogether. 1
42
IV.Recent Laws and Proposals-Help for Consumers?
In 2004, Utah became the first state to pass legislation
specifically addressing the issue of spyware.1 43 "Spyware" is defined
under the statute to be any software that monitors a computer's usage,
reports on that usage, or triggers advertisements, and does not
provide the adequate notice (as defined by the statute) of its
actions.Inn The statute does provide exceptions for cookies and otherpotentially harmless software. 145  A suit can be brought by the
141 Plaintiffs Complaint at 13, 2004 WL 2309585, FrC v. Seismic Entm't
Prods., Inc., 2004 WL 2403124 (D.N.H. 2004).
142 See Jessi Hempel, The Hand that Bytes You, BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 21,
2005, at 11 (noting that companies are driven by profit to pursue spyware, even
making contradictory investments by selling software that removes spyware).
143 Spyware Control Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-40-101 to 13-40-401 (West
2004).
'44 Utah Code Ann. § 13-40-102(4).
141 Utah Code Ann. § 13-40-102(5).
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consumer, or by any advertiser or website that has had its content
obscured by pop-up advertising. 46  The relief under the statute
includes an injunction against the action, plus the greater of actual
damages or $10,000, which can be increased for a knowing
violation. 147 No class actions may be filed under Utah's law and ISPs
are immune from violation of the advertisement portion of the
statute. 
48
However, the law is not without controversy. It has been
challenged by WhenU, an ad-ware company and frequent litigant,
which took issue with the "context-based triggering mechanism"
language of the law. 149 The company was granted a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of the law by a Utah court on grounds
that it potentially violates the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution. 
50
If the law survives a constitutional challenge and is not later
pre-empted, it will serve as a meaningful deterrent to the spyware
problem by allowing a minimum damage recovery of $10,000. 151
Additionally, future programs would be required to provide adequate
notice of their consequences, as well allow for simple removal from
affected computers. 15 The law's exceptions for certain cookies, and
disallowance where sufficient notice has been provided, allows for
consumer protection without stifling innovation.
Congress has addressed the spyware issue and is poised to
take action against spyware. One law, introduced in the House is
called I-SPY l§4 and was passed by the House of Representatives 415-
'46 Utah Code Ann. § 13-40-301.
147 ld.
148 Utah Code Ann. § 13-40-302.
149 Utah Judge Halts Spyware Law, 6 No. 2 ANDREWS E-BUs. L. BULL. 14, 14
(2004).
150 Id.
151 Utah Code Ann. § 13-40-102 (providing for a minimum of $10,000
judgment against spyware makers).
152 § 13-40-102(4)(c).
153 See Utah Code Ann. § 13-40-102(5) (the law's safe haven for companies
who provide notice protects legitimate business concerns).
154 Internet Spyware Prevention Act of 2004, H.R. 4661, 108th Cong. (2004)
[hereinafter I-SPY].
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0 during the 108th Congress,' 55 although no such vote has yet been
taken during the 109th. I-SPY amends the CFAA to include
protection of personal information and to safeguard security
protection already existing on computers.' 56 It states that "no person
may bring a civil action under the law of any State if such action is
premised in whole or in part upon defendant's violating this
section." 57 In other words, enforcement of the statue is left to the
Attorney General, which is given a $10 million yearly budget to
combat spyware.1
5 8
I-SPY's focus is on the protection of personally identifiable
information and the customer's existing security protection, 159 which
are only two aspects of the problem with spyware. The list of
personally identifiable information is limited to name, address, e-mail
address, telephone number, social security number, and credit or bank
account information. Under I-SPY, consumers would have much
greater protection against spyware activity that is most likely to cause
serious financial harm-i.e. identity theft-but are not given added
protections against other forms of threats posed by spyware.
16 1
However, the punishable offense is merely the collection of that
information with intent to injure, not necessarily its use.162
Additionally, consumers would be protected from spyware that
attacks security protection already in place in the computer.'
6 3
Without understating the potential value that this legislation would
have in combating the growing threat of identity theft, it leaves
something to be desired in the fight against spyware. While many
programs would be illegal under this regime, many spyware
programs exceed the capacity of security programs to detect and
eliminate the threat.'64
155 150 CONG. REc. D1031-01, D1032 (2004).
156 I-SPY, supra note 154, at § 2.
157 Id.
158 id. at § 3.
159 Id. at § 2.
160 id.
161 I-SPY, supra note 154, at § 2.
162 id.
163 Id.
'64 See Slutsky & Baran, supra note 11 (spyware programs can be buried deep
inside hard drives making them difficult to detect).
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A more comprehensive proposal to fight spyware is the
Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act ("SPY ACT"),
introduced by Representative Mary Bono during the current 109th
Congress.' 65 The legislation is fairly complex, but outlaws many of
the practices currently used by manufacturers of spyware 66 and
creates rigorous notice and removal requirements for spyware that
collects information about the consumer.' 67 The statute calls for the
involvement of the FTC in regulating spyware 168 and, in most cases,
federalizes legislation aimed at the spyware problem.'
69
The SPY ACT's notice section calls for a comprehensive
notice requirement for software downloads containing spyware that
collects information,1 70 one of the chief problems with the current
legal regime. The notice must be clearly displayed for the consumer
to accept or decline, with three possibilities depending on the type of
software:
1) This program will collect and transmit information about
you. Do you accept?
2) This program will collect information about Web pages
you access and will use that information to display
advertising on your computer. Do you accept?
3) This program will collect and transmit information about
you and your computer use and will collect information
about Web pages you access and use that information to
display advertising on your computer. Do you accept? 171
The consumer would be able to see what type of information
is to be collected in more detail, and for what purpose the information
is to be collected, without having to accept. 72 Another important
165 SPY ACT, H.R. 29, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter SPY ACT].
'66 Id. at § 2.
167 Id. at § 3.
168 Id. at §§ 3-4.
169 Id. at § 6.
170 SPY ACT, supra note 165, at § 3.
171 Id. at § 3(c)(1)(B).
172 Id. at § 3(c)(1)(D).
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consumer feature of the SPY ACT is its proposed removal
provisions, which require the program to be easily removable by the
consumer, and its provisions for clear markings delineating which
"pop-up" advertising is caused by which spyware program. The
FTC would be authorized to issue regulations to further the goal of
both removal and notice under this section. 
174
The enforcement of the law would be left to the FTC under its
powers of the FTC Act, with certain modifications: the statute allows
a $33,000 or $11,000 penalty for each computer affected by a
violation of Sections 2 or 3, respectively; and fines of $3 million and
$1 million for each violation of Sections 2 or 3 that affect multiple
computers, respectively. 175 The SPY ACT would preempt similar
state laws, except state trespass, contract, tort law, or fraud.
17 6
Interestingly, the statute provides an exception for cookies, and its
effective date runs only through the end of 2009.177
This type of act would protect against some of the worst
purveyors of spyware, and would fill at least part of the legal gap
currently in existence. The consumer would be given more explicit
notice requirements, allowing consumers to make the choice of what
programs to install with full knowledge of their potential harms.
178
Additionally, they would be able to remove unwanted software from
their computers. This would solve part of the problem with current
schemes to limit spyware-namely the question of consent. When
users merely skip over a license agreement, they may be waiving
their right to hold spyware distributors liable for any damage that
may be caused by the program.
IV.Conclusion
Rigorous enforcement of current laws is necessary to battle
the growing threat of spyware to consumers. Such spyware programs
could undermine the continued growth of the Internet as a forum for
commerce and interaction. Currently, however, only a few cases can
be brought by individual consumers against spyware companies and
173 SPY ACT, supra note 165, at § 3(d)(1).
174 Id. at § 3(d)(3).
... Id. at § 4(a)-(b).
176 Id. at § 6(a)(3).
177 Id. at §§ 8, 11(c).
178 SPY ACT, supra note 165, at § 3.
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the FTC can likely target only the most egregious offenders.
Proposed laws should not encourage litigation to the point where
innovation on the Internet is stifled, as consumers may be willing to
permit advertisements in order to use a free program in some cases.
Consumers, however, should have the choice to install any spyware-
containing programs, and should always have the ability to
completely remove any program they find offensive or of no use.

